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Summary: This article gives an insight into the most essential issues 
of EC/EU membership in the WTO. After briefly explaining the main 
functions of the GATT and the WTO, the author gives an overview of 
the EC/EU role in the GATT/WTO. The article outlines the major chall-
enges that both the EU and WTO face today. It argues that many of 
the changes within the EU have been influenced by its membership of 
the WTO. Finally, the article summarises the status of GATT and WTO 
agreements in EU law.
I. Introduction 
After the Second World War, the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) was established in 1947 as part of the Bretton Woods 
system. The main intention was to give the new world order an econo-
mic foundation, based on the theory of comparative advantage and free 
trade.1 From January 1995, the GATT was replaced by the World Trade 
Organization established with the Marrakesh Agreement. The main func-
tions of the WTO under the Agreement are outlined below.
First, the WTO oversees the operation of the WTO agreements on 
international trade. WTO agreements include: the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) together with twelve related agreements on tra-
de in goods in the area of agriculture, textiles and clothing, dumping, 
subsidies and countervailing measures, sanitary and phytosanitary me-
asures, technical barriers to trade, trade-related investment measures, 
safeguards, customs valuation, import licensing, rules of origin and 
pre-shipment inspection, the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS), and the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Pro-
perty (TRIPS Agreement). 
The WTO also serves as a forum for trade negotiations, trying to 
expand trade in goods and services in accordance with the principle of 
sustainable development and environmental protection.
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1  Gerhard Pischel, ‘Trade, Treaties and Treason: Some Underlying Aspects of the Difficult 
Relationship between the EU and the WTO’ (2001) 6(1) European Foreign Affairs Review 
103, 105.
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The third function assigned to the WTO under the Marrakesh Agree-
ment is the dispute settlement system. Dispute settlement is the central 
pillar of the multilateral trading system and makes the trading system 
more secure and predictable. For this reason, the creation of the WTO 
has very often been identified with the establishment of a system for the 
adjudicative resolution of disputes. Some authors even argue that the 
effectiveness and sophistication of the dispute settlement system surpa-
sses what has been achieved by other international tribunals, such as 
the International Court of Justice.2 The dispute settlement mechanism 
within the WTO is among the most highly legalised ones in the existing 
framework of international agreements.3 Under the WTO, the member co-
untries that are parties to various treaties under the WTO umbrella have 
access to dispute settlement as a right. This means that, unlike under 
the original GATT, the consensus of the member countries for the dis-
pute settlement ruling to become binding is no longer needed. So-called 
‘negative consensus’ exists under the WTO. This means that the dispute 
settlement ruling will not be binding only if all members, including the 
winning party, vote against its implementation. In all other cases, the 
ruling will be adopted as binding. In addition, it is determined when and 
how the losing party must act in order to implement the dispute settle-
ment ruling, or otherwise the party can become a subject to arbitration. 
In cases where the losing party does not implement the ruling in accor-
dance with the findings of the arbitration, retaliation4 is automatically 
authorised. Additionally, the legal decision of the first-instance panel 
may be appealed to the Appellate Body. The Appellate Body is composed 
of seven jurists, three of whom sit on each case.5 These are all fundamen-
tal changes to how the GATT system operated.  
 The establishment of the WTO caused major shifts in the issues that 
were previously dealt with by the GATT. The focus on tariff barriers was 
shifted towards issues connected to trade-related investment measures, 
trade in services and trade related aspects of intellectual property. 
The fact that Europe is the biggest trader in the world, responsible 
for roughly a fifth of the global trade in goods and services, marks the 
relationship between the EU and the World Trade Organization as one 
2 See Robert Howse, ‘Adjudicative Legitimacy and Treaty Interpretation in International 
Trade Law: The Early Years of WTO Jurisprudence’ in JHH Weiler (ed), The EU, WTO and 
NAFTA: Towards a Common Law of International Trade? (OUP 2000) 35.
3 Billiet, ‘From GATT to the WTO: The Internal Struggle for External Competencies in the 
EU’ (2006) 44(5) JCMS 899, 901.
4 The trade concessions that the winning party gives to the losing party will be withdrawn. 
5 For more on the procedures for dispute settlement in the WTO, see ‘Understanding on 
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes’ (WTO 2011) http://www.wto.
org/english/docs_e/legal_e/28-dsu_e.htm accessed 25 May 2011. 
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of the cornerstones of contemporary global governance.6 The previously 
mentioned changes implemented with the establishment of the WTO, the 
strengthening of the institutional framework of the WTO, and the increa-
se of the scope of the organisation have had an important impact on the 
balance of power within the EU with regard to trade policy.7 For these 
reasons, both the status of the EU in the WTO and the status of the WTO 
in the EU will be examined.
II. The status of the EC in the GATT 
The GATT promoted trade liberalisation on the basis of non-discri-
mination, transparency and reciprocity. However, the GATT also defined 
a number of important exceptions to these principles, such as: continued 
use of tariffs, import quotas, anti-dumping duties, and subsidies. One of 
these exceptions concerned free trade areas and customs unions.8 The-
refore, some authors argue that the GATT enabled the establishment of 
the EC in the first place.9 However, with the exception of free trade areas 
and customs unions, the GATT gave the EC an opportunity to play an 
important role within its system. 
The European Community was not a contracting party to GATT 1947. 
Only the EC Member States were. However, over the years, the EC acqu-
ired the status of a contracting party for all purposes.10 All trade agree-
ments and protocols negotiated in the GATT framework provided in their 
final provisions that the agreements were open for acceptance by the ‘con-
tracting parties to the GATT and by the EEC (or EC)’.11 Since 1970, most 
agreements negotiated in the GATT framework have been accepted only by 
the EC, ie without separate acceptance by the EC Member States.12
Starting with the Treaty of Rome in 1957, the internal tariff walls 
within Europe were gradually taken down. The Member States of the Eu-
ropean Communities established a common set of tariffs towards the rest 
of the world, while the duties on internal trade were dismantled in 1968. 
According to article 133 TEC, the EC had the authority to manage the 
common tariff wall. Therefore, the EC was acting as a contracting party 
6 JL Mortensen, ‘The World Trade Organization and the European Union’ in KE Jorgensen 
(ed), The European Union and International Organisations (Routledge 2009) 80.
7 See Billiet (n 3) 899.
8 GATT article XXVI.
9 See as an example Mortensen (n 6) 83.
10 Jacques HJ Bourgeois, ‘The European Court of Justice and the WTO: Problems and 
Challenges’ in Weiler (n 2) 71.
11 See as an example article VI (1) in the International Bovine Meat Agreement; art 9.1.1 in 
the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft.
12 See Bourgeois (n 10) and Jacques HJ Bourgeois, ‘The Tokyo Round Agreements on Tech-
nical Barriers and on Government Procurement’ (1982) 19 CML Rev 5.
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under GATT and had effectively replaced its Member States as bearers of 
rights and obligations. This could only have been done with the consent 
of the other GATT contracting parties. Since 1960, all GATT contracting 
parties have accepted that the EC exercised practically all the rights and 
fulfilled all the obligations under GATT law as a GATT contracting party.13
Another interesting aspect of the relationship between the EC and 
the GATT is the gradually changing role of the EC within different ro-
unds of GATT negotiations. Mortensen identifies the EC as a defensive 
GATT player at the beginning of the GATT’s existence. According to him, 
external circumstances permitted internal factors to shape EC behaviour 
in the early GATT years, allowing domestic priorities to dominate trade 
diplomacy. He defines this behaviour as a defensive version of Europe-
an neo-mercantilism, and claims that this was more or less tolerated 
by the US, although concrete trade conflicts were fought bilaterally and 
occasionally inside the GATT.14 However, none of these conflicts caused 
fundamental problems. The main issue on which the EC was attacked 
in Washington and Geneva was its Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). 
This was the case because US farmers felt the effects of the CAP in falling 
world market prices. During the 1960s, both the European Member Sta-
tes and industry representatives fended off US demands for market libe-
ralisation. Therefore, the Kennedy Round (1964–1969) was perceived as 
a consolidation of the EC as a defensive GATT player. 
It was only the Tokyo Round (1973–1979) that set GATT in motion 
after the standstill of the 1960s. However, it failed to produce new GATT 
rules on new forms of protectionism, namely the non-tariff barriers.15 
Nevertheless, during the Uruguay Round, GATT diplomacy changed gre-
atly. Fourteen negotiation groups were formed to conclude agreements 
on issues like agriculture, intellectual property rights, and services, as 
well as institutional reforms.16 Besides the fact that the deadline establis-
hed for the Uruguay Round was not met, and that there were major di-
sagreements on issues connected with agriculture, this was a significant 
stage for both the EC and the GATT. EC diplomats played a leading role 
in all other areas of the Round. After certain hesitations, the EC joined 
forces with the Americans on the GATS and TRIPS issues, and endorsed 
US ideas on the inclusion of services and on intellectual property rights.17 
Agriculture may have caused many difficulties, but the breakthroughs 
on the GATS, TRIPS and dispute settlement reforms proved to be more 
13 See,Bourgeois (n 10) 72; Mortensen (n 6) 83-86.
14 Mortensen (n 6) 83-86.
15 ibid.
16 ibid.
17 R Leal-Arcas, ‘The Resumption of the Doha Round and the Future of Services Trade’ 29 
Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review 339.
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significant. Both agreements protect current European competitiveness 
in designer goods, pharmaceuticals and the global service industries.18
III. The Status of the EU in the WTO
The EC became an original member of the WTO in 1994. Due to its 
extensive and exclusive competences on trade policy issues, membership 
came as a continuation of the practice of the EC’s de facto membership in 
the GATT. As the Member States have competences in some WTO issues, 
they are also WTO members. Article XI of the Marrakesh Agreement that 
established the WTO states that the contracting parties to GATT 1947, 
including all of the EC Member States and the European Communities, 
would become original members of the WTO. However, there is no requi-
rement for a declaration of competence. With regard to voting, each WTO 
member has one vote, while the EC has a number of votes equal to the 
number of its Member States that are WTO members. It is also stipula-
ted that the number of votes of the EC and its Member States shall not 
exceed the number of the Member States.19 In practice, voting is rarely 
used in WTO decision making. 
Furthermore, after the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, the EC Co-
uncil, the Commission, and the Member States agreed on a ‘code of con-
duct’ for future WTO negotiations.20 The ECJ emphasised the duty of the 
Community and the Member States to cooperate in the work of the WTO 
in Opinion 1/94 Competence of the Community to conclude international 
agreements concerning services and the protection of intellectual proper-
ty—article 228 (6) EC Treaty.21 However, the ECJ did not further elabora-
te the consequences of that duty. The EC Commission, the Council, and 
the Member States subsequently entered into negotiations over a general 
code of conduct for the participation of the EC and its Member States in 
the WTO, but the negotiations were never concluded. The matter became 
part of the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference leading to the Amsterdam 
Treaty, which only managed to achieve a limited modification of article 
133 EC Treaty. At present, there is still no general document on EU and 
Member States participation in the WTO.22
Nevertheless, there seemed to be no major difficulties in practice 
arising from this joint membership and the Community was the main 
18 Mortensen (n 6) 83-86. 
19 Art IX Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO.
20 Rachel Frid de Vries, ‘European Community, Membership in International Organizations 
or Institutions’, The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (OUP 2009 online 
edition) <www.mpepil.com> accessed 24 May 2010.
21 ECJ, Opinion 1/94 (WTO Agreements) [1994] ECR I-5267.
22 Frid de Vries (n 20).
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actor.23 There are a number of factors that explain the success of this 
joint membership which in effect comes close to exclusive Community/
Union membership. Perhaps the most important one is that legal, econo-
mic, and diplomatic expertise in trade issues is generally located in the 
European Commission. Therefore, there is no real difference in how dis-
putes that concern mixed competences and those concerning exclusive 
competences are dealt with. In both cases, Commission officials are the 
primary actors.24
After the Treaty of Lisbon came into force, the EC was replaced by 
the European Union as a member of the WTO. The powers within the 
Common Commercial Policy of the Union are delegated from the national 
to the supranational level on all matters concerning international trade. 
Accordingly, the European Commission speaks for the Union in the WTO 
and acts like all other foreign policy actors in the WTO. It is common 
practice to let the EU representative speak on behalf of all Member States 
in the WTO. This is the case even if individual Member States are present. 
Furthermore, with regard to WTO dispute settlement, the legal service of 
the Commission is the one that takes up the defence in cases brought 
against EU Member States. 
It is the European Commission that negotiates at the World Tra-
de Organization on behalf of the EU. The Commission coordinates with 
the EU Member States through the Trade Policy Committee (article 133 
Committee)25 and conducts EU policy following the guidelines set down 
by the Member States in the Council of Ministers. The Commission also 
23 See Frid de Vries (n 20); Mortensen (n 6) 83-87.
24 See the research on the experiences of DG trade officials and officials from the Commis-
sion’s legal service dealing with WTO disputes in Billiet (n 3) 906. 
25 Article 133 Committee was provided in article 133 TEC. This is a Council committee 
chaired by the Council Presidency and consists of high-level Member State civil servants 
in the EU Council of Ministers in Brussels. It is responsible for assisting the Commission 
in negotiations on trade and tariff matters which the latter conducts on behalf of the Com-
munity. It has a key role in ensuring that the Council accepts the final results of negotia-
tions, and therefore in the formation of unity. From a formal view point, it is the Council 
Presidency that leads the negotiations in article 133 Committee, but de facto and from a 
substantial point of view it is the Commission that leads the negotiations to find a com-
mon position in trade matters. From a procedural view point, article 133 Committee is not 
a voting committee, just a consultative body. In order to have close cooperation between 
the national and the European levels on issues of exclusive and mixed competence, there 
are continuous informal negotiations between article 133 Committee and the Commission. 
For example, in the case of trade in services, there are bilateral or multilateral negotiations 
every two weeks. The Commission tries to follow the decision of the majority in these nego-
tiations. However, when there is no convergence between national and supranational inter-
ests, the Commission may impose its position. Different commercial issues are discussed in 
article 133 Committee before being sent to the WTO for negotiation. Since most issues are, 
therefore, treated in article 133 Committee, in principle there is no need to go to the politi-
cal level (COREPER or General Affairs Council) to solve problems, unless no consensus is 
found at the technical level. 
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regularly informs the European Parliament of key WTO issues. When an 
agreement is negotiated at the WTO, the Commission needs the formal 
authorisation of the Council and European Parliament to sign the agree-
ment on behalf of the EU. All agreements must be ratified by the Council 
of Ministers by a qualified majority. Under the Lisbon Treaty, the role 
of the Parliament in the process of concluding international agreements 
has been strengthened and the consent of the EP is needed before the 
conclusion of treaties.26 Therefore, according to this procedure of the Ge-
neva negotiations, it can be seen that the diplomatic machinery of the EU 
within the WTO is rather complex. Namely, the relevant European Par-
liament Committees, like those on International Trade or Development, 
are considered to be part of the permanent apparatus of EU trade diplo-
macy. At the centre of EU diplomacy at the WTO is the DG External Trade 
unit in the Commission. DG Trade consists of roughly 550 people, cu-
rrently headed by Commissioner Karel De Gucht.27 Furthermore, Article 
133 Committee is also part of the core diplomatic machinery. The ‘EU 
representation to International Organizations in Geneva’ is another part 
of trade diplomacy even if it also manages relations with other Geneva-
based international organisations. Finally, the national representation 
of the Member States in Geneva should be added to this list.  Therefore, 
the conclusion is that the power of EU trade bureaucracy in daily WTO 
matters is significant. The governance of the WTO, which is mostly issue-
specific, requires extensive legal and diplomatic expertise. This places the 
Commission at the centre of most everyday activities in the WTO.  
Most of the criticism on EU representation in the WTO, particularly 
in the United States, goes to the double weight of votes. Since both the 
European Union and its Member States are formally represented in the 
WTO process, it is argued that EU interests have double weight in the 
WTO. Nevertheless, article IX of the WTO Agreement determines that the 
number of votes cannot exceed the number of the individual European 
Community (EC) Member States. Moreover, the WTO Councils and bodi-
es operate on a consensus voting norm and thus WTO issues are almost 
never put to a formal vote. Consensus is determined in the corridors and 
not by counting votes at meetings.28 
According to Bourgeois, anomalous dual membership may prove to 
be a bad solution, especially for the EC/EU and from the Member States’ 
perspective. Under GATT 1947, the other contracting parties had pra-
gmatically accepted the EC as a single entity on the grounds that one 
should not open Pandora’s Box in reviewing the GATT in order to formally 
26 Article 218 TFEU.
27 ‘Organisation’ (European Commission: Trade 2011) <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/about/
organisation/index_en.htm> accessed 1 June 2011.
28 Mortensen (n 6) 82.
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substitute the EC for its Member States. Article XI of the WTO Agreement 
caries the risk that these efforts will come to naught.29 
After the establishment of the WTO, according to Mortensen, the 
European Union took over leadership in the negotiation process. The EU 
put forward a new agenda, the so-called ‘trade and ... agenda’.30 Under 
the leadership of the EU, labour standards, exceptions for better envi-
ronmental protection, procurement liberalisation and global competition 
rules were put on the agenda. However, the rest of the WTO was hostile, 
especially to issues like social rights and the environment. The develo-
ping world had little confidence in the EU. To them, this looked more 
like ‘neo-colonialism and green protectionism than free and fair world 
trade’.31 
In 2001, the EU was the main instigator of the Doha Development 
Agenda. After eight rounds of trade negotiations initiated by the United 
States, the ninth one in Doha was initiated by the EU after five years 
(1996-2001) of campaigning. According to Anders Ahnlid, the EU met 
with a fair degree of success in its quest for a new round, despite the per-
sistent protectionist nature of the Common Agricultural Policy and the 
new demands emanating from civil society on trade policy in areas such 
as the environment, labour rights and global justice. He argues that the 
ability of the European Commission to form appropriate strategies de-
pends on EU willingness and its ability to exert leadership. A successful 
strategy has to strike a balance between what is needed to satisfy EU 
Member States domestically, on the one hand, and what is feasible at the 
multilateral level, on the other hand.32 
The process of strengthening the institutional frame work of the dis-
pute settlement system within the WTO has enabled the Commission to 
play an important role in disputes regarding new trade issues. This fact 
opened up possibilities for gradual adjustments to article 133 TEC - the 
core article of the Common Commercial Policy - to incorporate areas such 
as services, intellectual property and investment.33 After the Treaty of Li-
sbon came into force, article 207 (ex article 133 TEC) read:
The common commercial policy shall be based on uniform princi-
ples, particularly with regard to changes in tariff rates, the conclusion 
of tariff and trade agreements relating to trade in goods and services, 
29 Bourgeois (n10) 73.
30 Mortensen (n 6) 86.
31 ibid.
32 Anders Ahnlid, ‘The European Union and the Launch of the Doha Round’ in Ole Elg-
ström and Christer Jönsson (eds), European Union Negotiations: Processes, Networks and 
Institutions (Routledge 2005) 130-133.
33 Billiet (n 3) 902.
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and the commercial aspects of intellectual property, foreign direct in-
vestment, the achievement of uniformity in measures of liberalisation, 
export policy and measures to protect trade such as those to be taken in 
the event of dumping or subsidies. The common commercial policy shall 
be conducted in the context of the principles and objectives of the Union’s 
external action.
The EU considers itself as the most loyal supporter of the WTO. The 
WTO has widespread membership covering over 150 countries. There-
fore, WTO membership is increasingly seen as a necessary recognition 
by the international community of the reliability of one country’s trade 
policy and a necessary step towards reaping the benefits of international 
trade. It is therefore not surprising that the number of countries reque-
sting accession to the WTO is increasing and spreading to various areas 
of the world. Nor is it surprising that countries are ready to undergo len-
gthy negotiations in order to complete the accession process compared to 
the time that was requested under GATT. Acceding to the WTO, however, 
is totally different compared to acceding to the GATT. Whilst the GATT 
had a rather limited scope, the WTO is an organisation covering almost 
all facets of international trade and continues to expand. Hence, acceding 
to the WTO is often compared to ‘catching a moving train’.34
IV.  WTO influence on EC/EU external competences
No other multilateral treaty has raised so much discussion as the 
1994 WTO Treaty concluded as a mixed agreement by the EC and its 
Member States. The EC (today EU) can use the ‘mixed agreements’ for-
mula ‘when it appears that the subject matter of an agreement or con-
tract falls in part within the competence of the Community and in part 
within that of the Member States’.35 
The conclusion of the Uruguay Round led to disagreement between 
the Commission, on the one hand, and the Council, or most Member Sta-
tes at least, on the other. The dispute was provoked by the issue of the 
responsibilities of who signs what. The Commission claimed that everyt-
hing that was covered under the WTO Agreement, including TRIPS, fell 
under article 133 TEC.36 The Common Commercial Policy (CCP) is one 
of the pillars of the EC/EU external policy and the EC/EU has exclusive 
competence over issues falling within the scope of article 133 TEC (article 
207 TFEU). This puts the Commission in a central position. For this rea-
son, it is not surprising that the Com mission was eager at the time of the 
34 Frid de Vries (n 20).
35 ECJ, Opinion 2/91 (Convention No 170 of the International Labour Organization con-
cerning safety in the use of chemicals at work) [1993] ECR I-1061, para 36.
36 On this issue, see Billiet (n 3) 902-904.
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Uruguay Round to have new issues included under the CCP. Most Mem-
ber States, on the other hand, disagreed with the Commission’s broad 
interpretation of article 133 TEC. Their disapproval was mostly over the 
Commission’s insistence on including trade-related aspects of intellectu-
al property rights and trade in services. According to the Council, these 
issues fell outside the scope of the CCP and thus outside the scope of the 
EC’s exclusive competence. The solution to this issue was found in the 
opinion of the European Court of Justice. The procedure for obtaining 
an opinion from the Court was provided in article 300(6) TEC (article 
218(11) TFEU). Eight Member States, including Germany, France and 
the UK, filed separate briefs to the Court supporting the position of the 
Council.37 According to Billiet, this is a telling sign of how strongly the 
Member States felt about this issue and of the degree of resistance to the 
Commission’s interpretation.38  
In its opinion 1/94,39 the Court confirmed that the European Commu-
nity has exclusive competence with regard to trade in goods and also for 
cross-border services. Yet it denied the EC exclusive competence over other 
types of trade in services and for most trade-related aspects of intellectual 
property rights. The Court concluded that the harmonisation of laws of the 
Member States on intellectual property rights does not necessarily need to 
be accompanied by agreements with non-member countries in order to be 
effective. However, the Court also rejected the view of the Member States 
that a number of clauses of the TRIPS agreement – those related to judici-
al remedies – fall within the exclusive competence of the Member States. 
Therefore, neither the Community nor the Member States have exclusive 
external competence in relation to TRIPS. It can be said that the Court 
sided with the Council and the Member States. Its final conclusion was 
that the EC and the Member States have shared competence to conclude 
services agreements, except for cross-border services which are covered 
by article 133 TEC. Therefore, the EC and its Member States are jointly 
competent for concluding the TRIPS agreement, except for the fight against 
counterfeit goods which also falls under the CCP.40 Since the EC did not 
have exclusive competence over all the issues involved, the final result was 
that the WTO charter was signed as a mixed agreement.
According to Bourgeois, Opinion 1/94 could have negative effects on 
the status of the EC within the WTO.41 Billiet argues that such gloominess 
37 ECJ, Opinion 1/94 (Competence of the Community to conclude international agree-
ments concerning services and the protection of intellectual property) [1994] ECR I-5267.
38 Billiet (n 3) 902.
39 ECJ Opinion (n 37). 
40 ibid.
41 See Jacques HJ Bourgeois, ‘The EC in the WTO and Advisory Opinion 1/94: An Ech-
ternach Procession’ (1995) 32 CML Rev 763.
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is quite understandable in the light of the events of the mid 1990s.42 Na-
mely, the Delors Commission was largely independent of the control of the 
Member States. For the Member States, especially for France, the Commi-
ssion went too far when it negotiated the Blair House agree ment referring 
to agricultural issues in November 1992. This agreement between the EC 
and the US was negotiated by an autonomous Commission. However, the 
outcome was unacceptable to France. In the end, France gathered enough 
Member States supporting its position to force the Commission to renego-
tiate the agreement. Therefore, this act was perceived as a turning point in 
the delegation of negotiating authority to supranational representatives.43 
At the same time, the Commission at this stage was not very popular – 
either within the Member States or with general European popular opini-
on.44 Therefore, Opinion 1/94 could not be read as an endorsement for the 
Commission. 
Nonetheless, through the years, the Commission has played an im-
portant role within the GATT/WTO and especially in issues connected 
to TRIPS. Article 133 TEC has also evolved over the years, and today it 
includes the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements relating to trade 
in services, the commercial aspects of intellectual property, and foreign 
direct investments.45 The Commission has long argued for incorporating 
services and intellectual property rights into article 133 TEC. The Mem-
ber States, as well as the ECJ in Opinion 1/94, strongly opposed this. 
Nevertheless, the situation has changed substantially since the new WTO 
dispute settlement system became operational. The strengthened posi-
tion of the Commission in the WTO dispute settlement system and the 
Member States’ reliance on the Commission in this setting has paved 
the way for the evolution of article 133 TEC. The WTO’s legal approach 
to dispute settlement influenced the position of the Commission in the 
internal division of competences within the EC/EU. According to Billiet’s 
alternative explanation of the role of the European Commission within 
the WTO, the Member States, despite the preferences they might have 
and the central decision-making role they occupy within the EU, are so-
metimes overtaken by events on the ground, caused by their reliance on 
the Commission in the dispute settlement system. This, then, adds to the 
pressure for a more formal shift in powers to the benefit of the Commi-
ssion by transforming its de facto gained competences into de jure ones.46
42 Billiet (n 3) 902-904. 
43 ibid.
44 According to Eurobarometers 33 and 37, the percentage of people with a favorable 
impression of the Commission was down from 56% in 1990 to 47% in 1992 <http://
ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb33/eb33_en.pdf> and <http://ec.europa.eu/
public_opinion/archives/eb/eb37/eb37_en.pdf> accessed on 30 May 2011.
45 Article 207 TFEU.
46 Billiet (n 3) 916. 
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This position is strengthened by the fact that the dispute settlement 
system within the WTO is structured in a way that gives an advantage 
to the big countries. Therefore, it is the Commission as a representative 
of the EC/EU that ben efits. The position of the Commission is further 
strengthened by the fact that it possesses the necessary expertise. As a 
result of the strengthened institutional framework of the WTO, the Com-
mission has been able to gain competences that it otherwise might not 
have gained. Furthermore, the legalised dispute settlement sys tem wit-
hin the WTO favours the Commission. It changes the incentives of the 
Member States to be represented by the Commission and in this way it 
at tributes greater importance to the skills that the Commission posse-
sses.47 Therefore, even though the Member States have obviously expre-
ssed their preference not to give the EC/EU exclusive competence in the 
field of TRIPS, the Commission has succeeded in becoming the major 
European player in the WTO. 
V. The Status of the GATT and the WTO agreements  in EU law
Unlike its position for other international agreements, the ECJ avoi-
ded stating that the GATT forms an integral part of Community law. This 
was mainly due to the fact that the EC was not a contracting party to 
GATT 1947. However, the ECJ did not use this qualification for the WTO 
either.48 On the other hand, in connection with agreements concluded 
by the EC/EU with non-Member States, the Court had generally been 
willing to consider the direct effect of the treaty provisions.49 Since the EC 
had been very active on the international stage, numerous treaties with 
non-Member States or group of nations were concluded. These Commu-
nity agreements, just as for all international agreements, did not have 
automatic direct effect within the domestic legal order of the Member 
States. However, the Court was willing to enable EC citizens to bring ca-
ses based on such agreements before courts within the EC.50 Therefore, 
it seems that the ECJ rulings on the GATT were inconsistent with the 
judgments on the agreements concluded by the EC with non-Member 
States. The ECJ held that GATT 1947 needs to be respected by the EC 
as part of international law. However, there was no obligation to give the 
GATT direct effect within the Community’s legal order. Great flexibility, 
the lack of reciprocity and permission for unilateral withdrawal were the 
47 See S Billiet, ‘The EC and WTO Dispute Settlement: The Initiation of Trade Dis putes by 
the EC’ (2005) 10(2) European Foreign Affairs Review 197; J Heliskosi, ‘Joint Competence 
of the European Community and its Member States and the Dispute Settlement Practice of 
the World Trade Organization’ (1999) 2 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 61.
48 See Bourgeois (n 10) 103-108.
49 Case 12/86 Demirel v Stadt Schwäbisch Gmünd [1987] ECR 3719; Case 104/81 Haupt-
zollamt Mainz v Kupferberg [1982] ECR 3641.
50 Pischel (n 1) 111.
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main features of the GATT. Therefore, its provisions were not able to have 
direct effect within the legal order of the European Community.51
The context in which the GATT was perceived within EC law chan-
ged considerably after the establishment of the World Trade Organiza-
tion. This was mainly due to the distinctly developed character of the 
WTO in relation to the GATT, as well as to the conclusion of a number of 
agreements within its framework. The issue of the direct effect of WTO 
agreements was once again at the centre of EU international relations law 
at the beginning of the 1990s. It was the Council that clearly indicated 
its unwillingness to attribute direct effect to the WTO agreements. The 
following is stated in the Preamble of the Council resolution concluding 
the agreements of the Uruguay Round:
The Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization, including 
the annexes thereto, is not susceptible to being invoked in Community or 
Member State courts.52 
This statement, in political terms, however, is in line with the ECJ’s 
approach. According to the established case law of the ECJ, Member 
States cannot normally invoke WTO law to invalidate Community law. In 
cases brought by Member States to review the lawfulness of Community 
measures, however, the reasons given by the Court are the same as those 
for which it refuses direct effect,53 establishing parallelism in the case law 
between Member States and private parties, and maintaining it.54 Howe-
ver, the Court had held previously that an agreement concluded by the 
EC is not inclined to direct application if the parties have ruled out direct 
effect. The statement of the Preamble has not been agreed upon with the 
other members of the WTO. As the EC had neither put forward a reserva-
tion when signing the Agreement nor put in a provision prohibiting direct 
effect, the statement in the Preamble as such may not carry much weight 
when interpreting the Agreement in its context.55 
According to Pischel, the issue of direct effect of WTO law raises con-
stitutional concerns relating to democratic government, legal certainty, 
and legal equality. The direct effect of WTO law would increase the need 
for international legislation, but the WTO system does not have at its dis-
51 See Cases 21-24/72 International Fruit Company NV et al v Produktschap voor Groenten 
en Fruit [1972] ECR 1219 para 27; Case 70/87 Fediol III [1989] ECR 1805 para 19-20; Case 
280/93 Germany v Council (Banana Regulation) (1994) ECR I-4873 para 109.
52 Council Decision 94/800 concerning the conclusion on behalf of the European Com-
munity, with regard to matters within its competence, of the agreements reached in the 
Uruguay Round multilateral negotiations (1986-1994) [1994] OJ L336, 1.
53 Case 300/98 & Case 392/99 Dior [1998] ECR I-11307 paras 44-45; Case 268/94 Portu-
gal v Council [1999] ECR I-8395.
54 See L Barani, ‘Relationship of the EU Legal Order with WTO Law: Studying Judicial Ac-
tivism’ (2009) Garnet Working Paper 70/09, 8-15.
55 See Pischel (n 1) 126.
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posal an institution that could serve as legislator.56 Pischel argues that 
the principle of legal equality should also be considered. The EU legal 
system addresses the concern that EU law might not be applied equally 
by domestic courts through various mechanisms, above all the prelimi-
nary rulings procedure according to article 267 TFEU (article 234 TEC).57 
The WTO system, by contrast, does not provide for a similar mechanism 
to guarantee the equal application of WTO law in domestic courts. Mo-
reover, there is the issue of potential discrimination against domestic 
producers if WTO law is applied directly.58 
VI. Conclusion
The European Union’s membership in international organisations is 
an important issue, because of the major role that international organisa-
tions are playing in global and regional cooperation between states nowa-
days. Global international organisations pose great challenges to the fu-
ture of the European Union, since they are very often called upon to work 
out solutions to problems which individual states are no longer able to deal 
with on their own. The Union’s membership in these organisations is cru-
cial for European influence in the world to be emphasised and for global 
questions, such as free trade, environmental protection, the free flow of 
telecommunications, technical standards, to be handled firmly.
Furthermore, external relations are of vital importance to the Union 
and to its future development. The representation and relations of the 
Union with international organisations and third states depend mainly 
on the division of powers between the Union and its Member States in 
the field of external relations. The dynamics of the development of the 
EU show a progressive extension of its external competences to act in 
the field of external relations. For these reasons, the article has aimed 
to present the role that the EC had within the GATT and the role that 
the EU has within the WTO as one of its original members. It shows how 
significant the impact of the WTO has been on the development of the 
EC/EU. The WTO has consistently challenged the Common Agricultural 
Policy, one of the traditional cornerstones of European integration. In ad-
dition, the processes of globalisation have been sponsored by the WTO, 
in turn influencing the global environment in which the European Union 
is situated. The very existence of the WTO helps free traders within the 
European Union strengthen their position against trade protectionists. 
Finally, depending on the changing configurations of EU domestic power, 
policies are shaped accordingly. 
56 ibid.
57 ibid.
58 ibid.
